Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest

[ Why it matters ]Priority signals

• Public proof-of-concept exploit exists (CISA SSVC)

[ Description ]Official description

Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.2, registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads a manifest returned for a digest-pinned request and passes it to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without hashing the body against the requested digest, allowing a malicious or intercepted registry response to substitute attacker-chosen manifest content even when Docker-Content-Digest claims the requested value. The bundled pull-through proxy in registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go can cache and re-serve the substituted manifest. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.2.

[ Fixes ]Fixes and patches

• github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 3.1.2Fixed version · GitHub Advisories · go package github.com/distribution/distribution/v3: upgrade to 3.1.2 or later (affected < 3.1.2)

[ Packages ]Affected open-source packages

• github.com/docker/distribution goAffected <= 2.8.3 · GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3
• github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 goAffected < 3.1.2 · fixed in 3.1.2 · GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3

[ References ]References

• github.com/distribution/distribution/commit/960439b09f342cdeb8f1c0e18e8c7349bdcfbf80
• github.com/distribution/distribution/releases/tag/v3.1.2
• github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3