SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated WebSocket frame length

[ Why it matters ]Priority signals

• Public proof-of-concept exploit exists (CISA SSVC)

[ Description ]Official description

SIPGO is a library for writing SIP services in the GO language. Prior to 1.4.3, WSConnection.Read in sip/transport_ws.go creates a wsutil.Reader without setting MaxFrameSize, allowing NextFrame to accept a client-controlled header.Length before ParseMaxMessageLength is applied. An unauthenticated WS or WSS peer can send a frame header declaring an extremely large payload, causing an oversized allocation or a makeslice length panic before the payload is read and crashing or exhausting memory in the server process. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.

[ Fixes ]Fixes and patches

• github.com/emiago/sipgo 1.4.3Fixed version · GitHub Advisories · go package github.com/emiago/sipgo: upgrade to 1.4.3 or later (affected <= 1.4.2)

[ Packages ]Affected open-source packages

• github.com/emiago/sipgo goAffected <= 1.4.2 · fixed in 1.4.3 · GHSA-8h6x-h86x-75wh

[ References ]References

• github.com/emiago/sipgo/security/advisories/GHSA-8h6x-h86x-75whx_refsource_CONFIRM
• github.com/emiago/sipgo/commit/769e4bc958376e2363566c8f7042202b410becdcx_refsource_MISC
• github.com/emiago/sipgo/releases/tag/v1.4.3x_refsource_MISC