Zapros: Streaming decoders ignored the requested chunk size, allowing a single compressed response chunk to allocate unbounded memory (decompression bomb)

[ Description ]Official description

Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.

[ Fixes ]Fixes and patches

• zapros 0.14.0Fixed version · GitHub Advisories · pip package zapros: upgrade to 0.14.0 or later (affected < 0.14.0)

[ Packages ]Affected open-source packages

• zapros pipAffected < 0.14.0 · fixed in 0.14.0 · GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5c

[ References ]References

• github.com/kap-sh/zapros/security/advisories/GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5cx_refsource_CONFIRM